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Risky Business: Attorney Liability in Insurance 
Defense Litigation—A Review of the Arizona 
Supreme Court’s Decision in Paradigm  
Insurance Co. v. Langerman Law Offices 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The unique nature of the tripartite relationship, created when an 
insurer hires a lawyer to represent an insured, has created confusion 
on the part of many insurance defense attorneys.1 In such 
circumstances, it can be unclear how to ethically proceed with 
insurance defense litigation in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
malpractice liability. Although intended to simplify the ethical 
dilemmas for lawyers, a tripartite relationship often creates a situation 
in which the lawyer retained by the insurer to represent the insured 
does not know who her client is—the insurer, the insured, or both.2 
Often, the divergent interests of the insurer and the insured magnify 
the attorney’s dilemma of loyalty. 
In the absence of concrete and consistent common law decisions 
regulating the procedural aspects of insurance defense, some courts 
have recently begun to rely heavily upon the newly enacted 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (“Restatement”) 
to determine the ethical boundaries of lawyer conduct.3 
 
 1. See Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance 
Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 262–63 (1995) (“Insurance defense lawyers are integral 
parts of the engine that drives civil litigation, and the rules that govern their conduct are both 
extraordinarily vague and often wrong.”). 
 2. See Allison M. Mizuo, Note, Finley v. Home Insurance Co.: Hawai’i’s Answer to the 
Troubling Tripartite Problem, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 675, 675 (2000). Thomas D. Morgan, a 
law professor at the George Washington University Law School, writes: 
The question of whom the lawyer represents in such cases is not new. It was implicit 
in articles written by Professor (now Judge) Robert Keeton beginning more than 
forty years ago. But it has been raised again with unusual intensity in response to 
publication of a recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers. 
Thomas D. Morgan, Whose Lawyer Are You Anyway?, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 11, 13 
(1997). 
 3. See, e.g., Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 600 (Ariz. 
2001). Although it is still too early to know just how much of an impact the Restatement 
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Unfortunately, inconsistencies among some jurisdictions have only 
perpetuated the problems in this area of the law. One prominent 
author has noted, “[t]he rules [surrounding insurance defense 
litigation] fail to provide clear and defensible answers to the most 
basic questions, such as whether an attorney-client relationship exists 
between the insurance company and the lawyer retained to handle 
the lawsuit against the insured.”4 Consequently, “the obvious danger 
is that insurance defense lawyers will act improperly, even when they 
attempt to adhere to the law.”5 
Recently, some courts have unsuccessfully attempted to clarify 
both the procedural standards governing insurance defense litigation 
and the ethical boundaries of the attorney-client relationship.6 
Paradigm Insurance Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, decided by the 
Arizona Supreme Court in June of 2001, is such a case.7 Although 
the Langerman court may have achieved an equitable result, it failed 
to advance the proper analysis in reaching its result. If the 
inconsistent procedural standards are not clarified, uncertainty and 
ambiguity regarding the duties of insurance defense attorneys will 
continue to result in inconsistent representation and possible injury 
to the insurer, the insured, and especially the attorney. Insurance 
defense lawyers will continue to flounder as to whom they actually 
represent and where their duties of loyalty lie.  
Part II of this Note reviews the facts and the reasoning of the 
court surrounding the Langerman decision. Part III discusses the 
history of the tripartite relationship between the insured, the insurer, 
and the lawyer hired to represent the insured. In order to elucidate 
 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (“Restatement”) will have on the formation of law, some 
scholars believe “its impact will be great.” Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, Are Liability 
Carriers Second-Class Clients? No, but They May Be Soon—A Call to Arms Against the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, COVERAGE, Mar.–Apr. 1996, at 21. 
The American Law Institute, the sponsor of the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers, is an enormously influential organization. Its various Restatements, which 
blend consensus with reform, have gained widespread adoption by state courts and have 
sometimes changed the face of the American law. For example, the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts greatly facilitated the spread of strict liability law and, hence, the growth of enterprise 
liability theory. Id. 
 4. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 263. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Parichan, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Pine Island Farmers’ Coop. v. Erstad & Riemer, P.A., 649 N.W.2d 444 
(Minn. 2002). 
 7. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 594. 
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the basic procedural standards that should govern this area of the 
law, this Note will discuss the origin of the tripartite relationship 
itself, the attorney-client privilege, the potential conflicts of interest 
unique to the tripartite relationship, and the definition of a client. 
Part IV reviews the scholarly thought with regard to attorney liability 
in the insurance defense context, asserting that the retainer 
agreement should define the scope of liability for the attorney.8 Part 
V will apply the retainer agreement theory and will discuss the 
application of this theory to Langerman. This Note ultimately 
concludes that the retainer agreement should be the operative 
document all parties in the tripartite relationship look to for 
clarification regarding an insurance defense attorney’s duties to the 
client. Such a standard is critical in minimizing attorney malpractice 
liability for lawyers engaged in the risky business of the tripartite 
relationship. 
II. BACKGROUND AND FACTS SURROUNDING LANGERMAN 
The issue before the Arizona Supreme Court in Langerman was 
“whether an attorney may be held liable to an insurer, which 
assigned him to represent an insured, when the attorney’s negligence 
damage[d] only the insurer.”9 The plaintiff, Paradigm Insurance 
Company (“Paradigm”), had issued an insurance policy covering 
medical malpractice liability to Dr. Benjamin A. Vanderwerf, Medical 
Director of Samaritan Transplant Service.10 Renee Taylor, one of 
Vanderwerf’s patients, brought a malpractice suit against him and 
included Samaritan Health Services (“Samaritan”) as a defendant, 
claiming that Vanderwerf was acting as an agent for Samaritan at the 
time the alleged malpractice occurred.11 Under Vanderwerf’s liability 
policy, Paradigm was responsible (1) for paying the doctor’s liability 
to Taylor if such liability was found, and (2) for paying for the legal 
defense of any liability claims against the doctor.12 At the time the 
complaint was filed against Vanderwerf, Paradigm hired an attorney, 
Langerman, to represent Vanderwerf; Vanderwerf consented to this 
 
 8. The thesis of this Note is based upon the theories of Professor Charles Silver, law 
professor at the University of Texas School of Law. 
 9. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 594. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 11–12, for a review of the basic insurance coverage 
included in a typical liability insurance policy similar to the policy in Langerman. 
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representation.13 “During the course of representation, Langerman 
advised Paradigm that it believed there was no viable theory of 
liability against Samaritan. Langerman, however, failed to investigate 
whether Vanderwerf was covered by Samaritan’s liability insurance 
and, thus, was unable to advise Paradigm whether the defense could 
be tendered to Samaritan.”14 
When Paradigm later learned that Langerman had a conflict of 
interest with Paradigm, Paradigm terminated Langerman as 
Vanderwerf’s counsel and hired a new attorney.15 The new counsel 
discovered that, in addition to being covered by Paradigm, 
Vanderwerf was also covered by Samaritan Insurance Funding 
(“SIF”) and that SIF was Vanderwerf’s primary coverage.16 
However, when Vanderwerf’s new counsel attempted to tender the 
claim to SIF, SIF rejected the claim “on the grounds that the tender 
was untimely,” leaving Paradigm with the obligation to pay Dr. 
Vanderwerf’s entire liability.17 Although Langerman’s negligence did 
not injure Dr. Vanderwerf (the insured) it allegedly increased 
Paradigm’s (the insurer) costs tremendously by forcing Paradigm to 
take sole responsibility of the settlement without the opportunity of 
turning to SIF for contribution or indemnification.18 Thus, when 
Langerman requested payment for his services, Paradigm refused to 
pay, citing Langerman’s negligence as justification. Langerman then 
sued for collection of his fees, and Paradigm filed a counterclaim for 
damages.19 
The trial court, in granting summary judgment, “held that 
because there was no express agreement that Langerman could 
represent both Paradigm and Vanderwerf, no attorney-client 
relationship existed between Langerman and Paradigm.”20 The trial 
 
 13. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 594. 
 14. Id. at 594–95. 
 15. See id. at 595. 
 16. See id. Recognizing the potential benefits of Dr. Vanderwerf’s dual coverage, the 
Arizona Supreme Court stated, “At least hypothetically [being covered by both a primary and a 
secondary carrier] would be of some benefit to Vanderwerf: if SIF was determined to be the 
primary and Paradigm the excess carrier, Vanderwerf’s malpractice protection for Talyor’s [sic] 
claim would be increased to the combined limits of the two policies.” Id. 
 17. Id. Taylor’s claim against Vanderwerf “was eventually settled for an amount within 
Paradigm’s policy limits.” Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. 
AND-FIN 9/30/2002 10:37 AM 
643] Attorney Liability in Insurance Defense Litigation 
 647 
court accordingly found that “Langerman owed no duty of care to 
Paradigm and could not be held liable for negligence that injured 
only Paradigm but not Langerman’s sole client, Vanderwerf.”21 The 
court of appeals reversed in part on the theory of an implied, rather 
than express, attorney-client agreement, holding that where no “real 
or apparent conflict between the insured and the insurer” existed, 
insurance defense counsel actually represented both, thus creating a 
duty of care on the part of the attorney not only to the insured but 
also to the insurer.22 Because the trial court had granted summary 
judgment in Langerman’s favor, the Arizona Supreme Court 
assumed that Langerman was actually negligent in causing financial 
harm to Paradigm.23 
Although the court left some issues unresolved, like whether 
Langerman’s failure to determine the primary provider actually 
constituted an act of negligence, the Arizona Supreme Court 
identified three main issues discussed in this Note: (1) whether an 
express agreement is necessary to form an attorney-client 
relationship, (2) whether potential and actual conflicts of interest 
arise with the insurer as client, and (3) whether a duty to a non-
client exists. In its holding, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that 
when the interest of the insurer and the insured coincide, the lawyer 
has a duty to the insured and the insurer, and can therefore be liable 
to the insurer even if the insurer is considered to be a non-client.24 
The next three sections of this Note will articulate the reasoning of 
the Langerman court concerning these three main issues. The 
wisdom of the court’s analysis, however, will be challenged later in 
this Note. 
A. Formation of Attorney-Client Relationship 
Through an Express Agreement 
The Langerman court relied upon the Restatement and other 
Arizona cases to hold that an express agreement was not required to 
establish an attorney-client relationship.25 The plaintiff, Langerman, 
argued to the contrary that no duty of care could be created between 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. at 594. 
 24. See id. at 602. 
 25. See id. at 596. 
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the lawyer and the insurer if an attorney-client relationship did not 
exist; furthermore, Langerman argued, if the lawyer had no duty of 
care to the insurer, he could not be liable for alleged negligent 
conduct which injured the insurer but not the insured. In rebutting 
Langerman’s arguments, the court cited Restatement section 14, 
which states, “A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: (1) a 
person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer 
provide legal services for the person; and . . . (a) the lawyer manifests 
to the person consent to do so . . . .”26 Additionally, the Langerman 
court defined an attorney-client relationship as being created when 
“an ordinary person would look to the lawyer as a protector rather 
than as an adversary.”27 Thus, an alleged client’s reasonable and 
objective “belief that [the lawyer] was [his] attorney” is necessary to 
establish an attorney-client relationship, in this case, between the 
insurer and the lawyer.28  
B. Potential and Actual Conflicts of Interest 
Between Insurer and Insured 
Perhaps one of the most debated issues surrounding the 
insurance defense attorney liability question regards the analysis of 
how and to what extent conflicts of interest between the insurer and 
the insured affect procedural rules governing the lawyer’s 
relationship to the client(s). Although the Langerman court refused 
to determine whether both Paradigm and Vanderwerf were 
Langerman’s clients,29 it did hold that “when an insurer assigns an 
attorney to represent an insured, the lawyer has a duty to the insurer 
arising from the understanding that the lawyer’s services are 
ordinarily intended to benefit both insurer and insured when their 
interests coincide.”30 
However, the Langerman court repudiated the “view that the 
lawyer automatically represents both insurer and insured until the 
conflict [of interest] actually arises”31 by relying on Restatement 
 
 26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (1998). 
 27. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 596 (quoting In re Pappas, 768 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Ariz. 
1988)). 
 28. Id. (alteration in original). 
 29. Id. at 599. 
 30. Id. at 602. 
 31. Id. at 599. 
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section 121 and the basic rule prohibiting conflicts: A conflict of 
interest exists “if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s 
representation of the client would be materially and adversely 
affected by the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to . . . a 
third person.”32 Agreeing with Langerman, the court reasoned “that 
actual conflicts between insured and insurer are quite common and 
that the potential for conflict is present in every case.”33 However, 
the court concluded that the interests of the insurer and the insured 
do not inherently conflict but “frequently coincide.”34 For example, 
both the insured and the insurer share an interest in “presenting a 
strong defense to a claim that they believe to be unfounded as to 
liability, damages, or both.”35 The Langerman court suggested that 
in such cases, there is a high probability that “the potential for 
conflict may never become substantial,”36 and will, consequently, 
never satisfy the Restatement’s definition of a conflict of interest.  
C. Duty to Non-Clients 
Instead of classifying the insurance company as a second client, 
which would have essentially required the court to delve into 
uncharted legal terrain, the Langerman court held that even if the 
insurer were not a client to the attorney, the attorney, depending on 
the facts of the case, might still be liable to the insurer.37 The court 
relied upon the Restatement section 51(3) to show that even if the 
insurer were a non-client, an attorney may be liable to the insured in 
some cases: 
[A] lawyer owes a duty of care . . . to a nonclient when and to the 
extent that: 
 
 
 32. Id. at 597 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 121 (1998)). 
 33. Id. The court made a short list, albeit not exhaustive, of the potential conflicts of 
interest that may be present between the insurer and the insured. Id. Such conflicts included 
the scope of the coverage, how the case is to be defended, how information is shared, and the 
desirability of settlement. Id. See infra Part III.B for a more in depth discussion of these and 
other potential conflicts that are relevant to the debate regarding whether an attorney should 
be liable to the insurer. 
 34. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 598. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 600. 
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(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary 
objectives of the representation that the lawyer’s services 
benefit the nonclient; 
(b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer’s 
performance of obligations to the client; and 
(c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of 
those obligations to the client unlikely.38 
Furthermore, the court explained that a lawyer owes a duty to 
the insurer when the interests of the insurer and the insured are not 
in conflict, “whether or not the insurer is held to be a co-client of 
the lawyer.”39 Ultimately, the following statement proved compelling 
for the Langerman court: “Because and to the extent that the 
insurer is directly concerned in the matter financially, the insurer 
should be accorded standing to assert a claim for appropriate relief 
from the lawyer for financial loss proximately caused by professional 
negligence or other wrongful act[s] of the lawyer.”40  
III. HISTORY OF INSURANCE DEFENSE COUNSEL LIABILITY 
AND THE TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP 
Understanding the origin of the tripartite relationship is crucial 
to analyzing Langerman. In the context of insurance defense 
litigation,41 “most insurance policies accord to the insurer the duty 
to defend the insured and the right to control the insured’s defense. 
When the insurer appoints counsel to defend an insured, the triad of 
insurer, defense counsel and insured”42 is what is known as the 
tripartite relationship. This relationship has been further explained as 
“a loose partnership, coalition or alliance directed toward a common 
goal, sharing a common purpose which lasts during the pendency of 
 
 38. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(3) 
(1998)). 
 39. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 
cmt. g). 
 40. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134 
cmt. g). 
 41. “The vast majority of liability insurance policies cover both risks, obligating the 
insurance company to defend lawsuits against the insured, to pay the costs of defense, and to 
indemnify the insured for judgments and settlements up to a specified limit.” Silver & Syverud, 
supra note 1, at 264. 
 42. Eileen M. Dacey, The Delicate Balance of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the 
Tripartite Relationship, 602 PLI/LIT 199, 203 (1999). 
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the claim or litigation against the insured.”43 The debate regarding 
this controversial relationship between the insurer, the attorney hired 
by the insurer, and the insured is not new. In the 1940s through the 
1960s Professor (now Judge) Robert E. Keeton brought the issues 
surrounding the tripartite relationship to the forefront of scholarly 
attention;44 however, during the 1970s and 1980s the “subject 
dropped off the radar screen insofar as most academics were 
concerned.”45 In recent years, however, the pronouncement of the 
Restatement (Third) of the Laws Governing Lawyers, the political 
attention directed toward the insurance industry, and the drastic 
increase in insurance malpractice suits have all contributed to a 
resurgence of the tripartite debate.46 
Current attempts to explain the unique ethical issues of the 
tripartite relationship have, for the most part, proven fruitless.47 One 
author described the tripartite relationship as “ethically sanctioned 
‘duality of representation.’”48 Another author noted that the 
Restatement’s analysis of the relationship was “conceptually 
impoverished,”49 while the American Bar Association recognized that 
“[t]he Model Rules of Professional Conduct offer virtually no 
guidance as to whether the lawyer retained and paid by an insurer to 
defend its insured represents the insured, insurer, or both.”50 Such 
issues are at the heart of the tripartite relationship itself. Another 
author, after trying to define the ethical duties and boundaries of 
insurance defense lawyers, explained: 
 
 43. Robert B. Gilbreath, Caught in a Crossfire Preventing and Handling Conflicts of 
Interest: Guidelines for Texas Insurance Defense Counsel, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 139, 144–45 
(1996) (quoting Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 571 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1974)). 
 44. Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the 
Continuing Battle over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205, 
206 (1997–98). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. One author has referred to the complex issues of the tripartite relationship as an 
“ethical minefield.” Dacey, supra note 42, at 203. 
 48. Gilbreath, supra note 43, at 142 (quoting Michael J. Brady & Heather A. McKee, 
Ethics in Insurance Defense Context: Isn’t Cumis Counsel Unnecessary?, 58 DEF. COUNS. J. 230, 
230 (1991)). 
 49. Silver & Quinn, supra note 3, at 21, 39; see also Morgan, supra note 2, at 15. 
 50. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 45 (2001) 
(quoting ABA, FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 1983–1998, at 403 (2000)) 
(discussing the ethical obligations of lawyers who are hired by insurance companies). 
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If this rudimentary compass seems inadequate, that is because it is. 
The eternal triangle has vexed insurance defense practitioners for 
years and navigation is getting no easier. Emerging conflict of 
interest issues pose new problems, and even a minor error in 
direction or judgment can throw defense counsel hopelessly off 
course.51 
The difficulty in wading through the tripartite quagmire 
originates from the ethical dilemmas regarding representation posed 
to insurance defense attorneys. Such dilemmas include, but are not 
limited to, issues of loyalty to the client and conflicts of interest 
between the insurer and the insured. The following hypothetical 
illustrates a typical conflict of interest in the tripartite: Dr. Jones is 
sued for malpractice by her patient. Concerned about her medical 
reputation, Dr. Jones desires that the case go through trial so that 
she can be vindicated of any wrongdoing. She does not want to 
settle the claim because she fears that doing so may subject her to 
review before the licensing board. Furthermore, she knows her 
premiums will skyrocket if she settles. The insurance company, on 
the other hand, prefers to settle the claim for as little as possible 
rather than go through trial. It knows that any court decision could 
have long-lasting effects not only on its business but also on the 
entire industry, and it fears having to pay the potentially enormous 
damages award if it loses at trial. Conflicts of interest such as this 
exist in almost every liability insurance tripartite relationship. 
Due to a deficit of judicial and legislative direction regarding the 
procedural requirements of loyalty to one’s client and the 
ambiguities surrounding the question of just who the client is in the 
tripartite context, insurance defense attorneys are currently left 
unguided and unprotected from malpractice liability.52 Indeed, in the 
 
 51. Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 536 (1995). 
 52. Professors Silver and Syverud have summarized the issues as follows: 
Insurance defense lawyers are integral parts of the engine that drives civil litigation, 
and the rules that govern their conduct are both extraordinarily vague and often 
wrong. The rules fail to provide clear and defensible answers to the most basic 
questions, such as whether an attorney-client relationship exists between the 
insurance company and the lawyer retained to handle the lawsuit against the insured. 
Consequently, the rules are almost entirely unhelpful when more complicated 
questions arise. The obvious danger is that insurance defense lawyers will act 
improperly, even when they attempt to adhere to the law. The less obvious danger is 
that the procedural system, broadly understood as encompassing all the rules and  
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context of the Langerman decision, it is especially important to 
consider both the lawyer’s responsibility to the insurer53 and the 
procedural standards that should be established to protect the lawyer 
from unknowingly violating a duty of ethical conduct. The tripartite 
relationship “requires a delicate balance of rights and duties.”54 A 
good starting point for examining these rights and duties is the 
attorney-client relationship. 
A. The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Establishment of Liability 
Typically, only a client or an entity in privity of contract with the 
lawyer is authorized to sue the lawyer for malpractice (or 
negligence).55 Although privity was, historically, a fixed requirement 
for claims of negligence, many jurisdictions, including New York, 
continue to adhere to this privity rule.56 However, in the context of 
the tripartite relationship, general privity analysis has, for the most 
part, been augmented by the rules of professional responsibility and 
the question of whether an attorney-client relationship has been 
formed between the insurance defense attorney and the insurer.57 
 
forces that influence the progress of litigation, will work less well than it should, 
driving up insurance costs and distorting insurance contracts. 
Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 262–63. 
 53. See Michael Sean Quinn, Whom Does the Insurance Defense Lawyer Represent?, SE64 
ALI–ABA 171, 191 (2000). 
 54. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 45 (2001). 
 55. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 84–85 
(2d ed. 1994). 
 56. See id. at 85. States have adopted other theories that reject the privity requirement: 
Jurisdictions that, rejecting privity, hold that a lawyer may owe a duty of care to 
non-clients take a number of approaches. Some . . . apply a balancing-of-factors 
approach giving substantial weight to whether the situation is one in which it is 
reasonably foreseeable that a lawyer’s absence of due care will directly harm a third 
person . . . . Other jurisdictions . . . limit the duty of care for negligent lawyer 
conduct to situations in which the lawyer’s services are intended to influence or 
benefit specific third persons. 
Id. at 85–86. The Langerman decision seems to fall into this third category when it quotes the 
Restatement. See Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 600 (Ariz. 
2001). For further elaboration on the negligence/malpractice theories used by various 
jurisdictions, see generally Richmond, supra note 51, at 484–85. 
 57. Most scholars agree that, in the context of the tripartite relationship, the question of 
whether an attorney-client relationship has been formed between the insurance defense 
attorney and the insured is clear: “The relationship between defense counsel and the insured is 
simply that of attorney and client, and the relationship imposes on defense counsel the same 
duty of unqualified loyalty as if personally retained by the insured.” Gilbreath, supra note 43, 
at 145. 
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The preeminent question in determining the extent of an insurance 
defense lawyer’s responsibilities and liabilities within the tripartite 
relationship is whether the lawyer has an operative attorney-client 
relationship with the insured, the insurer, or both. Who the lawyer 
represents has significant ethical ramifications. In fact, much of the 
tripartite debate centers on the number of clients an insurance 
defense attorney represents: “one (the insured) or two (the company 
and the insured).”58 This section will briefly discuss the rules of 
professional responsibility, including the rules governing the 
attorney-client privilege, which may clarify the ethical conflict of 
interest issues present in the tripartite relationship.59 
The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) 
offers little direction concerning the conduct of a lawyer who 
represents two clients. Simply stated, “A lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to 
another client,” unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the 
representation will not be adversely affected and that each client 
consents to such representation.60 Further, a lawyer may not 
represent a client if such representation is “materially limited” when 
the lawyer represents an additional party.61 In the insurance defense 
context, this instruction from the Model Rules allows the practitioner 
great discretion in determining whether the insured’s interest will be 
adversely affected. To avoid losing clientele, practitioners will most 
likely err on the side of the insurer, finding no material limitations in 
the representation. Such discretion combined with the inherent 
conflicts of interest leave the practitioner vulnerable to malpractice 
liability. 
The Model Rules stress the importance of loyalty to one’s client. 
Such loyalty has arguably been a hallmark of successful lawyering in 
this country. For example, the Model Rules require a lawyer faced 
with a potential conflict of interest between clients to either decline 
representation or withdraw from the representation.62 However, “a 
possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation.”63 
 
 58. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 273. 
 59. See infra Part III.B for a discussion regarding the relative weight judiciaries ought 
to give to conflict of interest issues that exist in the tripartite relationship. 
 60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1)–(2) (2001). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. R. 1.7 cmts.1–2. 
 63. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 4. 
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Indeed, “[t]he critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will 
eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the 
lawyer’s independent professional judgment . . . .”64 If the lawyer is 
paid by a source other than the client, as in the case of the lawyer 
who is hired and paid by the insurance company, the Model Rules 
allow representation only if the client gives informed consent to such 
representation.65 Client consent is usually not difficult to obtain 
because the client initially comes to the table seeking legal protection 
against future liability. If the client refuses to consent, the client’s 
only other option is to forgo liability insurance. Unfortunately, the 
Model Rules offer little further assistance in defining the ethical 
parameters of representation in the conflict-of-interest-ridden 
tripartite relationships.66  
The Model Rules do, however, highlight the importance of the 
attorney-client relationship. The first critical question is whether the 
lawyer has established an attorney-client relationship with the 
insurer. If the insurer is not a client, the insurer will have more 
difficulty establishing privity with the attorney. An attorney-client 
relationship67 is created to “protect[] confidential communications 
concerning legal advice between attorney and client.”68 Since the late 
eighteenth century,69 legal scholars have assumed that “[j]ustice 
could best be served if clients [were] encouraged to fully confide in  
 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. R. 1.7(b)(4). 
 66. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 45 (2001) 
(quoting ABA, FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 1983–1998, at 403 (2000)) 
(discussing the ethical obligations of lawyers hired by insurance companies). 
 67. See Michael Keeley, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrines: The 
Boundaries of Protected Communications Between Insureds and Insurers, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 
1169 (1998). For further study, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), in 
which the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential 
communications known to the common law. . . . Its purpose is to encourage full 
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The 
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that 
such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the 
client. 
(citations omitted). 
 68. JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.06 (3d 
ed. 2001). 
 69. Id. § 1.04. 
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their legal advisers. Assured confidentiality through the privilege is 
the source of that encouragement.”70 
Opponents of attorney liability to the insurer use the attorney-
client privilege71 rationale to bolster their argument that because 
inherent potential conflicts of interest exist in the tripartite 
relationship (between the insured and the insurer), the insurance 
defense counsel should not be helplessly juxtaposed between two 
potential sources of liability without the ability to protect against it.72 
Such advocates of protecting the sacredness of the attorney-client 
relationship would vigorously oppose the Langerman decision 
because, in general, Langerman allows a third party (insurer) to 
distract the attorney’s duty of loyalty to the client (insured). 
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides 
introductory guidance to insurance defense counsel, but fails to set 
forth clear rules to determine whether and in what contexts 
insurance defense counsel owes the insurer the same duty of care it 
owes the insured. For example, section 14 of the Restatement 
establishes: 
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: (1) a person 
manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer provide 
legal services for the person; and either (a) the lawyer manifests to 
the person consent to do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack 
of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the 
services . . . .73 
The Langerman court determined that “either intent or 
acquiescence may establish the relationship.”74 Comment c, however, 
states that the intent may be manifest by explicit “facts” and 
 
 70. Id. § 1.06. 
 71. The efficacy of the attorney-client privilege is not debated in this Note. Relatively 
little research has been performed to confirm whether the attorney-client privilege is effective 
in eliciting client confidence and communication. Id. “Nonetheless, it is worth noting the few 
empirical studies that have been undertaken. One focused on nonlawyer attitudes toward 
professional confidences. It found that approximately 50% of those surveyed said that their 
communications with counsel would be less candid without the privilege.” Id. In another 
study, corporate executives indicated that “trust and confidence in a particular attorney” was 
the most important factor in eliciting client communication other than the attorney-client 
privilege. Id. 
 72. For a more thorough analysis of this argument, see Morgan, supra note 2. 
 73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14(1)(a)–(b) (1998). 
 74. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 596. 
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“circumstances” such as a retainer agreement.75 Furthermore “[n]o 
written contract is required in order to establish the relationship;” 
however, “paying a lawyer does not by itself create a client-lawyer 
relationship with the payor if the circumstances indicate that the 
lawyer was to represent someone else.”76 Thus, in the context of the 
tripartite relationship, where a general retainer agreement between 
the attorney and the insured does not necessarily establish the insurer 
as a client, the Restatement is ambiguous as to whether a relationship 
exists between the attorney and the insurer. Yet it does state that, 
“due consideration should be given to the unreasonableness of a 
claimed expectation of entering into a co-client status when a 
significant and readily apparent conflict of interest exists between the 
[co-clients].”77 
Once a lawyer-client relationship is established, a lawyer has a 
duty to “act in a manner reasonably calculated to advance a client’s 
lawful objectives,” to “avoid impermissible conflicting interests,” and 
to “fulfil [sic] any valid contractual obligation to the client.”78 Under 
the Restatement’s scheme, these duties79 are only present once an 
 
 75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. c. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. An attorney-client relationship may arise when the client “reasonably relies on 
the lawyer to provide services, and the lawyer” reasonably knows or should know of the 
reliance. Id. at cmt. e, illus. 2. In the context of the tripartite relationship, an insurer may have 
reason to rely on the attorney to perform for the benefit of the insured, which often is for the 
benefit of the insurer as well. However, if the retainer agreement does not establish that the 
insurer is a client, the attorney may assume that she has a fiduciary relationship only to the 
insured. The assumption of the attorney in this scenario would be in accordance with the 
current majority rule in most jurisdictions. See infra Part III.C.2. Thus, the attorney may not 
reasonably know of the insurer’s reliance and, therefore, should not be held to have a duty of 
care to the insurer. 
 78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 28(1)–(4) (1992). 
 79. A draft of the Restatement explains the rationale behind a lawyer’s duty to a client: 
[A] lawyer is a fiduciary, that is, a person to whom another person’s affairs are 
entrusted in circumstances that often make it difficult or undesirable for that other 
person to supervise closely the performance of the fiduciary. Assurances of the 
fiduciary’s loyalty and care are therefore vital, are provided by law, and would 
presumably be provided by contract in any event by sophisticated persons in matters 
warranting the burdens of negotiation. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 28 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 
5, 1992). Both lawyers and insurance companies are attuned to the legal risks placed upon 
parties who assume liability. Both parties would probably be classified as “sophisticated 
persons” in the phraseology of the Restatement and, therefore, should be required to enter 
into a retainer agreement, detailing the intricacies of their relationship within the tripartite 
triangle. Retainer agreements are often vague. 
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attorney-client relationship is created.80 The Restatement seems very 
hesitant to eliminate the rules that currently protect clients from 
disloyal counsel. For example, section 28 advises that a lawyer cannot 
act “beyond the scope” of the representation without client 
permission and construes an attorney’s power broadly so as to avoid 
any temptation for the lawyer to use his power to abuse the client. 
Interestingly, the Restatement’s emphasis of the scope of the lawyer’s 
representation suggests that the scope of representation is useful in 
determining whether a relationship exists that would lead to a duty 
of care between the attorney and the insurance company. The 
Restatement instructs, “A lawyer must exercise care in pursuit of the 
client’s lawful objectives in matters within the scope of the 
representation. The lawyer is not liable for failing to act beyond that 
scope.”81 
Another way to characterize the issue in Langerman could be to 
analyze whether representing the insurance company was within the 
scope of the retainer agreement between Langerman and Paradigm. 
If the representation was within the scope of the agreement, then 
Langerman most likely had a duty of care to the insurance company; 
thus, his liability to the company would be justified. If the retainer 
agreement did not contemplate such an arrangement, then perhaps 
Langerman was incorrectly burdened with liability. At any rate, since 
“all jurisdictions permit clients to sue[,] . . . [i]t . . . makes sense to 
ask whether a company and an insured can qualify as clients before 
considering other theories that may entitle them to sue.”82 
The Langerman court based part of its ruling on the fact that the 
insurance company, as a third-party payor, was a non-client. The 
Restatement suggests that a lawyer may owe a duty of care to a non-
client when the non-client relies on the fact that the lawyer offers 
legal services to the client, that are intended to benefit the non-
client, and the lawyer knows of such reliance on the part of the non-
client.83 However, a lawyer’s duty to a non-client only exists when 
“such a duty would not create inconsistent duties significantly 
 
 80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. a (1998). 
 81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. d (1997). 
 82. Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the 
Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1592 (1994). 
 83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(2)–(3) 
(1994). 
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impairing the lawyer’s performance.”84 The Langerman court argued 
that the insurance company, as a non-client, had no recourse if 
Langerman had no duty of care to the company.85 Although it would 
be bad policy to allow an attorney’s negligence to injure a party that 
reasonably relied upon the attorney’s representation, it seems unfair 
to make the attorney liable to the insurer in cases where the retainer 
agreement between the lawyer and the insurer does not clearly define 
the lawyer’s duty. Without adequate procedural guidance governing 
an insurance defense attorney’s relationship with the insurer, the 
attorney could reasonably assume that his sole duty of care is to the 
insured. 
Finally, but no less important than the other Restatement 
provisions detailing how an attorney-client relationship is formed, 
Restatement section 134 indicates: 
A lawyer’s professional conduct on behalf of a client may be 
directed by someone other than the client if: (a) the direction does 
not interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional 
judgment; (b) the direction is reasonable in scope and character, 
such as by reflecting obligations borne by the person directing the 
lawyer; and (c) the client consents to the direction . . . .86 
In the insurance defense context, insurance companies who hire 
and pay for insurance defense counsel walk a fine line between 
relinquishing too much control to the attorney, which often results 
in excessive attorney fees and harmful settlements, and seizing too 
much control from the attorney, which often impairs the attorney’s 
ability to represent the primary client—the insured. Professor Silver 
has suggested that “[w]hen thinking about the question ‘Who may 
sue the lawyer?,’ it is important to keep firmly in mind that a person 
who claims the right to sue thereby claims either the authority to 
control how defense counsel acts or an entitlement to some sort of 
consideration or performance from defense counsel.”87 
 
 
 84. Id. § 73(3). 
 85. See  Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 599–600 (Ariz. 
2001). 
 86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134(2)(a)–
(c)(1998). The comments in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 
215 (1998) provide similar language as § 134. Therefore, this Note will not duplicate that 
analysis. 
 87. Silver, supra note 82, at 1592. 
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Although the Restatement does not comment on the relationship 
between the insurer and the insured,88 this relationship is governed 
by the policy contract agreed upon at the inception of coverage. The 
downside of exclusive company control is that the company may 
exercise so much control over the lawyer that the lawyer feels an 
economic incentive to “lick the hand that feeds it.” Obviously, this is 
a great risk to insureds who may feel the loyalty of their attorney 
swayed by the payor of the attorney’s fees.89 The Restatement 
contemplates this adverse effect and prohibits third-pary payors from 
exercising exclusive control over the attorney’s activities if the 
direction interferes with the attorney’s professional judgment.90 
Ultimately, it is clear that the insurance defense attorney has an 
attorney-client relationship with the insured. The insurer, however, is 
not entitled to such a relationship “simply by the fact that it 
designates the lawyer, a client of the lawyer.”91 Nevertheless, the 
non-lawyer party may have a cause of action against the attorney for 
 
 88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. f (1998). 
 89. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 24. 
[I]t is easy to see that a lawyer representing the insurer and insured as separate and 
equal co-clients faces a serious conflict of interest. . . . [T]he lawyer likely will never 
see the insured again, whereas the insurance company is a prospective source of 
many more legal fees. It is easy to imagine which ‘client’s’ interest the lawyer will 
have an incentive to favor. 
Id. Another author states: 
[The attorney] stands as a fiduciary to the insured, a status that requires the strictest 
observance of the insured’s best interests. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that 
counsel may have a long-standing relationship with the insurer, and that assignments 
from the insurer may generate a significant part of the attorney’s income. The 
insured, however, is likely to be a “one-off” client whose relationship with the 
attorney will last only for the life of the claim. Thus even the most punctilious of 
lawyers, one with the highest ethics and the “best of motives,” might be perceived 
by the courts as prone to favor the insurer over the insured. As the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has put it: “Even the most optimistic view of human nature 
requires us to realize that an attorney employed by [or retained by] an insurance 
company will slant his efforts, perhaps unconsciously, in the interest of his real 
client—the one who is paying his fee and from whom he hopes to receive future 
business—the insurance company. 
Dacey, supra note 42, at 204–05 (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser & Co., 
585 F.2d 932, 938 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978)); see also Michael Rigby, Note, The Broken Triangle—
Should Insurers Be Held Vicariously Liable for the Legal Malpractice of Counsel They Retain to 
Defend Their Insureds?—State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 
625 (Tex. 1998), 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 651, 663 (2000) (citing the old proverb: “He who pays 
the piper calls the tune”). 
 90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134(2). 
 91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. f. 
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malpractice92 if either (1) a lawyer-client relationship is created 
between the insurer and the attorney under Restatement section 14, 
or (2) the attorney owes a duty of care to a non-client under 
Restatement sections 5193 and 72. 
The insured arguably benefits by allowing the company to have 
exclusive control over the direction of the litigation and through the 
symbiotic relationship that exists between the insurer and the insured 
regarding their mutual need for defense counsel.94 
Why would a company want the right to defend and demand 
exclusive control of defense and settlement decisions? The reasons 
usually given for the right—the need to defeat unwarranted claims, 
the desire to minimize outlays on valid claims . . . and the need to 
prevent collusion between claimants and insured—emphasize the 
value the company derives from the right to defend. However, it is 
important to see that the insured also benefits from the rule of 
exclusive company control. The insured is protected by the 
company’s financial resources, expertise, and efficiency in dealing 
with claims, and by its risk-neutrality, bureaucratic structure, 
reputation, bargaining skill, and ability to select and monitor 
defense counsel, all of which enable the company to react to claims 
better than the insured. [Arguably], [i]nsureds understand these 
advantages and appreciate the value of the arrangement.95 
It is debatable whether insureds truly appreciate this arrangement 
as Professor Silver suggests. For the most part, insureds probably feel 
that, because they are coughing up their hard-earned cash—usually a 
large sacrifice—the insurer is obligated to provide quality liability  
 
 
 92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134 cmt. f, indicates 
that if these two conditions exist and if “the insurer is directly concerned in the matter 
financially, the insurer should be accorded standing to assert a claim for appropriate relief from 
the lawyer for financial loss proximately caused by professional negligence or other wrongful 
act of the lawyer.” 
 93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 states, in 
pertinent part, the following: 
A lawyer owes a duty to use care . . . to a nonclient when and to the extent that: (a) 
the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objectives of the 
representation that the lawyer’s services benefit the nonclient; (b) such a duty would 
not significantly impair the lawyer’s performance of obligations to the client; and (c) 
the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obligations to the 
client unlikely. . . . 
 94. Silver, supra note 82, at 1595–96 (citations omitted). 
 95. Id. 
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protection. Nevertheless, from an objective standpoint, mutual 
benefits are conceivable. 
Despite the mutual benefits of exclusive company control, under 
the Restatement approach (the approach relied on in Langerman), if 
an insurance company is a third-pary payor, the insurance company 
gives up the right to claim liability for attorney malpractice when it 
exercises exclusive control over the litigation. Arguably, when such 
control is exercised and the professional judgment of the lawyer is 
compromised, a conflict of interest is created between the insurer 
and the insured, which conflict requires the attorney to give her 
utmost loyalty to the insured at the expense of the insurer. 
Furthermore, in cases of exclusive control, the company essentially 
destroys its relationship status with the attorney, thereby eliminating 
the attorney’s duty of care to the insurer. 
The Restatement’s guidelines do not sufficiently answer 
Langerman’s real question: How is insurance defense counsel 
expected to know that it owes a duty of care to the insurance 
company when the case is one of first impression for the court and 
when the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Restatement 
are equally ambiguous? Nevertheless, assuming that the attorney-
client relationships are clearly defined, the inherent conflicts of 
interest between the insurer and the insured make joint 
representation in the tripartite context unethical.96 
B. Conflicts of Interest Between Insurer and Insured 
As explained previously, disagreements do arise between insurers 
and insured, which often result in conflicts of interest between 
insurer and insured.97 Such conflicts of interest can be the source of 
malpractice liability for insurance defense lawyers.98 The Restatement 
prohibits a lawyer from representing a client where such 
 
 96. The ABA has argued that “[a]lthough defense lawyers must be sensitive to the 
economic interests of the insurance companies . . . and cognizant of the fact that costs of 
litigation ultimately are borne by insureds through premiums, they must not allow their 
professional judgment or the quality of their legal service to be compromised materially by the 
insurer.” ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 46 (2001). 
 97. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 266–67; see also Stephen L. Pepper, Applying 
the Fundamentals of Lawyers’ Ethics To Insurance Defense Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 29–
30 (1997–98). 
 98. See Rian D. Jorgensen, Lawyers’ Professional Liability: Overview and Current Issues, 
563 PLI / LIT 89, 95–96 (1997). 
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representation would involve a conflict of interest.99 “A conflict of 
interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s 
representation of the client would be materially and adversely 
affected. . . .”100 The Restatement defines a “substantial risk” as a 
“significant and plausible [risk], even if it is not certain or even 
probable that [it] will occur. The standard requires more than a mere 
possibility of adverse effect.”101 An “effect” is “material” if it affects 
the obligations agreed to in the retainer agreement.102 
Many potential conflicts of interest could emerge in the tripartite 
relationship.103 For example, if the insurer knows it will not be 
vicariously liable to the insured, it may attempt to undercut the pay 
or the quantity of the attorney’s hours necessary to provide proper 
representation.104 Conversely, “retained counsel . . . could 
manipulate the trial strategy to benefit one client [over] the 
other.”105 The defense attorney “may [also] become aware of 
information damaging to a client through confidential 
communication with the other client.”106 Such disagreements 
between insured and insurer may arise for four reasons:  
(1) the insured no longer bears the risk of paying the judgment or 
settlement; (2) the insurer, and not the insured, bears the cost of 
providing the defense; (3) the insurer has “an additional stake in 
the outcome beyond the amount paid”; or (4) each party attempts 
to take strategic advantage over the other to its ultimate benefit.107 
 
 99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (1998). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. cmt. c(iii). 
 102. Id. cmt. c(ii). 
 103. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Emerging Conflicts of Interest in Insurance Defense 
Practice, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 69, 70 (1996) (examining the following emerging conflicts of 
interest, all of which create dilemmas regarding the attorney’s duty of loyalty to the insurer: 
“‘issue’ or ‘positional’ conflicts, the representation of former clients, insurer insolvency, ‘flat 
fee’ or ‘fixed fee’ agreements between insurers and their regular counsel, and insurers’ use of 
outside counsel guidelines to manage litigation”). 
 104. See Rigby, supra note 89, at 671. 
 105. Mizuo, supra note 2, at 681. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 266–67. However, Professors Silver and Syverud 
acknowledge, “Unfortunately, it is defense counsel who often must sort out these 
disagreements between the company and the insured in particular lawsuits. Generally, the 
disagreements arise after counsel has been retained by the insurance company (usually without 
a formal written retainer agreement) to defend the case.” Id. at 267–68. They argue that if the 
parties placed more emphasis on creating a retainer that specifically defined the scope of the 
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Unfortunately, an end to such conflicts of interest is not in sight. 
“Although a general framework of rules and guidelines has 
developed over time to govern this [tripartite] relationship, there 
remains a paucity of specific practical guidelines for the proper 
handling of problems raised by conflicts of interest.”108 One author 
expressed the frustration in the lack of judicial guidance as follows: 
Even were there such a [foolproof] compass, new or emerging 
conflicts pose difficult navigational problems. With limited 
precedent to provide direction in most new areas [of conflicting 
interests], defense counsel are left to rely largely on the Model 
Rules and fact-specific decisions of varying worth in order to find 
their professional way. Bon voyage.109 
Such expressions of hopelessness are not encouraging to insurance 
defense lawyers. 
In dealing with emerging conflicts of interest, the judicial 
majority agrees that the interests of the insured should be sustained 
over the interests of the insurer, whereas the minority of courts 
“generally accept[s] either the premise that counsel represents the 
insured exclusively upon being retained . . . or that . . . counsel 
primarily or exclusively serves the insured.”110 The next section 
discusses the theories regarding how these potential conflicts of 
interest should be mitigated. 
C. Determining Who the Client Is—Insurer, Insured, or Both 
With all the uncertainty regarding the procedural rules governing 
 
relationship between the insurer and the attorney and if the courts respected the retainer 
agreement and used it to identify liable parties, then the burden of deciphering legal 
ambiguities would be taken off the shoulders of the insurance defense counsel and onto the 
parties who form the initial agreements. Other conflicts of interest are also inherent in the 
tripartite relationship: 
Potential conflicts are by no means limited to issues involving the attorney-client 
privilege. They can arise when the claimed damages exceed policy limits, thus 
exposing the insured to personal liability; when counsel represents multiple insureds 
whose own interests may diverge; when punitive damages, (uninsurable in several 
jurisdictions and specifically excluded in may policies) are claimed; when the proofs 
at trial could result in non-coverage, e.g. a finding that the insured was not acting 
“within the scope of employment,” and many other areas . . . . 
Dacey, supra note 42, at 207–08. 
 108. Gilbreath, supra note 43, at 144. 
 109. Richmond, supra note 103, at 86. 
 110. Mizuo, supra note 2, at 682–83. 
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the tripartite relationship, it is not surprising that lawyers find such 
circumstances unnerving. Scholars on this issue agree that 
“[e]xperienced and thoughtful defense lawyers disagree on whether 
the company is a client. Some claim to represent only the insured. 
Some claim to represent the company for some purposes but not 
others, or they regard the company as an employer but not as a 
client.”111 But, rarely, because of frequent conflicts of interest, do 
insurance defense attorneys default to the assumption that they 
represent both the insurer and the insured in every instance. In a 
recent ethics opinion, the ABA admitted that “[t]he question 
whether the insurance company may be deemed a ‘client’ who can 
direct the scope and extent of the representation is unsettled . . . .”112 
However, several theories contribute to the jurisdictionally diverse 
but vexing debate regarding tripartite relationships: the two-client 
theory, the one-client theory, and the third-party-payor (or one-and-
a-half-client) theory.113 
1. Two-client theory 
The two-client theory is currently the majority view among 
courts in the United States.114 It advocates that both the insurer and 
the insured are clients of the insurance defense counsel. Thus, under 
the two-client approach the attorney owes a duty of care to both the 
insured and the insurer. The rationale behind this theory, as 
promoted mostly by the insurance industry in this country, is that 
both the insured and the insurer are beneficiaries of the company’s 
 
 111. Silver, supra note 82, at 1603. 
 112. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 46 (2001). 
 113. Jorgensen, supra note 98, at 98. The Langerman court seemed to use a 
combination of the third-party-payor approach and the two-client approach. It discussed both 
the reliance issue and the fact that the insurer was economically concerned, being the party to 
foot the costs of representation and settlement. See, e.g., Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law 
Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 599–601 (Ariz. 2001). It also briefly acknowledges the existence of 
company control in the fiscal management of the litigation. Id. at 596. 
 114. See Jorgensen, supra note 98, at 98; Mizuo, supra note 2, at 680; Silver & Syverud, 
supra note 1, at 273. The following cases, although not an exhaustive list, recognized the two-
client model: Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1330 (9th Cir. 
1995); Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 198 (Ala. 1988); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gladstone, 
93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145, 
1152 (Haw. 1998); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 329 
(Ill. 1991); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151, 160–61 (Ind. 1999); Moeller v. Am. 
Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d 1062, 1070 (Miss. 1996); Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 
1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). 
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exclusive control over the litigation.115 Further, the consent 
requirement makes managing the litigation more difficult.116 “The 
[insurance] industry argues that in the majority of cases that settle 
quickly and within policy limits, the insured does not need to know 
whether counsel was appointed, much less to consent to that 
appointment.”117 Although the Langerman court recognized the 
existence of potential conflicts of interest inherent in the tripartite 
relationship, it discounted the mere existence of a potential conflict 
where no actual conflict existed; thus, it found that the attorney was 
liable to the insurer118—a result that would similarly be reached 
under the two-client analysis. 
Apart from the tripartite context, the general law regarding joint 
clients is relatively clear on its face: “Clients may jointly retain (or 
one client may retain for the joint benefit of others) the services of 
an attorney as their common agent on a legal matter of common 
interest, and the attorney-client privilege will protect their 
confidential communications with that attorney.”119 Advocates of the 
two-client view discount the notion that conflicts of interest 
dominate the insurer/insured relationship and bolster the idea that 
“companies and insureds usually enjoy a substantial commonality of 
interests, even when their interests do not perfectly align.”120 Again, 
by holding that the attorney had a duty to the insurer only when 
conflicts of interest arose between insurer and insured, the 
Langerman court implicitly agreed with the notion that the interests 
of insured and insurers are usually in harmony with each other. 
2. One-client theory 
Although the two-client view is currently the majority rule, the 
judicial trend leads to “increasing the supremacy of the attorney’s 
obligation to the insured.”121 The rationale behind this movement 
 
 115. See supra Part III.A. 
 116. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 17. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 597. 
 119. PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 8:16 (2d 
ed. 1999). 
 120. Silver, supra note 82, at 1609. 
 121. Dacey, supra note 42, at 205; see also Jill B. Berkeley, Confidential Communications 
Among the Insured, the Insurer, and Defense Counsel, 26–SPG BRIEF 22, 26 (1997) 
(supporting the notion that a lawyer’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to the insured endorses the one-
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seems to be a greater emphasis on the integrity of the lawyer’s service 
to one client—the insured: 
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within 
the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of the client and free of 
compromising influences and loyalties. Neither the lawyer’s 
personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of 
third persons should be permitted to dilute the lawyer’s loyalty to 
the client.122 
The Michigan Supreme Court advanced the one-client view in 
Atlanta International Insurance Co. v. Bell,123 where the plurality 
found that an insurance company had not established an attorney-
client relationship with the insurance defense counsel “even though 
the company hired the lawyer, paid the lawyer’s fee, and bore the 
brunt of the lawyer’s misconduct.”124 
The Bell court chose the one-client theory based on the doctrine 
of equitable subrogation.125 Finding a happy medium in the 
application of this theory, the Bell court thought it too harsh to allow 
the insurer an attorney-client relationship with defense counsel 
because allowing such a relationship would dilute the attorney’s 
loyalty to the primary client—the insured.126 However, the Bell court 
also felt uneasy about barring the insurance company from any source 
of recourse for damages sustained.127 Rather than choosing one of 
these two extremes, the court, basing its holding on the theory of 
equitable subrogation, allowed the insurer to sue for malpractice only 
in circumstances where the insured was injured by the attorney’s 
negligence.128 By embracing the inviolability of an attorney’s absolute 
loyalty to her client, the Bell court strengthened the validity of the 
one-client theory. The language of the Restatement129 regarding the 
 
client school of thought); Jorgensen, supra note 98, at 98 (mentioning that although the one-
client view is gaining favor in the courts, the conflict of interest issues that vex the tripartite 
relationship will exist regardless of the particular view espoused); Silver & Syverud, supra note 
1, at 273 (claiming that the one-client view is gaining popularity). 
 122. Jorgensen, supra note 98, at 95. 
 123. 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991) (plurality opinion). 
 124. Silver, supra note 82, at 1584 (citing Bell, 475 N.W.2d at 297). 
 125. Bell, 475 N.W.2d at 298 (defining equitable subrogation as “the substitution of one 
person in the place of another with reference to the lawful claim or right”). 
 126. Id. at 298–99. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. The draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers was issued 
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number of an attorney’s clients illustrates the American Law Institute’s 
current favoritism of the one-client view.130 
3. Third-party payor or one-and-a-half-client theory 
The third-party-payor theory advocates that “the lawyer be 
deemed to represent both the insurer and the insured until 
something goes wrong, at which time the insurer would no longer 
be a client, at least in the usual sense.”131 The Langerman court also 
based its decision upon the third-party-payor theory, a theory 
premised on the assumption that, although undivided loyalty is 
required to the insured, the company is in the best position to 
manage and control the litigation and often relies on the attorney to 
protect its economic interests. If such litigation management can be 
done without compromising the loyalty an attorney owes to the 
insured, then the attorney can and should owe the insurer a duty of 
care.132 Under the third-pary-payor theory, the insurer, although not 
necessarily considered as having established an express attorney-client 
relationship with the attorney, relies upon the attorney’s 
representation to the insured. The insurer is thus permitted to sue 
the attorney who acts negligently.133 
Consistent with the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the 
predominant underlying premise of the third-party-payor approach is 
the concept of economic reliance on the part of the insurer. Because 
most insurance policy agreements give insurance companies the right 
to control the management of litigation, insurance companies have 
tremendous incentive to minimize costs. And indeed, some argue 
that the insurer’s direct financial concerns should justify its ability to 
 
several months before the Michigan Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bell. See Silver, supra, 
note 82, at 1588. Moreover, the proposed language in the Restatement “may turn out to be 
the most influential endorsement of the one-client view.” Id. at 1589. 
 130. See id. at 1588–89. Certain headings in the Restatement, “Lawyer’s Obligation to 
Third Persons” and “Fee Payment by a Third Person,” “leave little doubt as to the ALI’s 
estimate of the number of clients defense counsel represents.” Id. at 1588. 
 131. Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are Special 
Solutions Required?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 276 (1997–98) (advocating the one-and-a-half-
client view). 
 132. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 421, at 46 (2001). 
 133. The Restatement states that in some instances, “the lawyer’s duty arises from the 
principle of promissory estoppel, under which promises inducing reasonable reliance may be 
enforced to avoid injustice.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 
illus. 2 (1998). 
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sue the insurance defense lawyer for malpractice.134 As the 
Langerman court indicated, insurance defense negligence can have 
an enormous economic impact on the insurance company while it 
may have little or no effect on the insured.135 Although insurance 
companies may believe this theory would allow them to sue for 
malpractice while still maintaining exclusive control over the 
litigation, the Restatement “imposes limitations on the control that a 
third person may exercise over the lawyer’s work.”136 The 
consequence of these limitations are that, under the third-party-
payor view, insurance companies will not be able to enjoy the full 
range of benefits and rights of control they desire. 
IV. SOLUTION—LOOK TO THE RETAINER AGREEMENT 
The tripartite relationship makes all players in an insurance 
defense suit—insured, insurer, and insurance defense attorney alike—
vulnerable to uncertainty and possible injury. To mitigate potential 
damage to the insurance company, most insurance policies provide 
for some degree of company control over potential claims against the 
insured. Nevertheless, even after companies have taken proactive 
steps to protect themselves, insurance companies still find themselves 
vulnerable to economic injury. 
Although some courts, like Bell, apply the doctrine of equitable 
subrogation and allow the company to become an injured party only 
when the insured has been injured by the attorney’s negligence, questions 
still arise when the insured is not injured by attorney negligence. The 
Langerman court held that the attorney is liable because the insurer is, as 
a third-party payor, in a position of economic reliance and will be offered 
no other avenues of redress.137 Although the Langerman holding may 
have been an equitable result for the insurer in this particular case, it still 
generally leaves the insurance defense attorney in the dark regarding the 
attorney’s question of “to whom do I owe a duty of care?.” It seems clear 
that the uniqueness of the tripartite relationship, currently governed 
under the laws of professional responsibility, provides no adequate 
solution to protect all parties simultaneously. 
 
 134. See Quinn, supra note 53, at 182. 
 135. See Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 599–600 (Ariz. 
2001). 
 136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 cmt. a. 
 137. Langerman, 24 P.3d at 600. 
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Because neither the one-client, two-client, or third-party-payor 
views are inherently flawed per se, the parties ought to be able to 
create whatever type of arrangement they desire.138 However, in 
order to fill the ambiguous gaps within the tripartite relationship, 
courts should adopt a rule allowing the retainer agreement, formed 
between the insurer and the attorney, to become the operative 
document in judicial interpretation of the tripartite relationship.139 
The retainer agreement is usually created without a formal written 
document.140 This proposed “retainer rule” would not require a 
complete overhaul of the insurance defense system as it exists today, 
but it would encourage insurers and attorneys to form express 
retainer agreements that actually explain the intended relationship. 
As stated earlier in this Note, there are benefits to the insurance 
company controlling the scope of liability claims against the 
insured.141 Whereas the policy agreement or “liability contract” 
dictates the scope of the insurers’ indemnification of insured’s 
liability,142 the retainer agreement defines the scope of the 
relationship between the insurer and the attorney.143 In emphasizing 
the perilousness of absolute adherence to either the one-client or 
two-client approaches, Professors Silver and Syverud contend: 
[D]efense counsel has as many clients as the participants decide 
counsel should represent. Defense counsel has one client if and 
when the retainer agreement provides that counsel shall represent 
only the insured; defense counsel has two clients if and when the 
retainer agreement requires counsel to represent the company as 
well. Because attorney-client relationships arise consensually,  
 
 
 
 138. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 274. 
 139. Of course, such a rule would require the retainer agreement to be an express 
agreement. Currently the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 
only requires a manifestation of consent. Although it is contrary to the rule this Note proposes, 
the Langerman court held that an attorney-client relationship did not require an express 
agreement. 24 P.3d at 595. 
 140. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 267–68. 
 141. See Silver, supra note 82, at 1592, 1595–96. The company benefits from its right 
and its duty to defend the insured. “[I]t is important to keep firmly in mind that a person who 
claims the right to sue thereby claims either the authority to control how defense counsel acts 
or an entitlement to some sort of consideration or performance from defense counsel.” Id. at 
1592. 
 142. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 269. 
 143. See id. at 270. 
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whether defense counsel has one client or two depends upon the 
agreement that counsel enters into when retained.144 
The retainer theory is premised on the notion that both the 
insurer-attorney relationship and the attorney-client relationship are 
consensual in nature. Both the attorney-client relationship and the law 
of agency rely upon the formation of agreements.145 Thus, locking the 
parties into one arrangement theory when they may want to form 
another is unreasonable. Because only a party who has established an 
attorney-client relationship can sue the attorney for malpractice, 
allowing the insurer and the attorney to establish the privity 
relationship formally in the retainer agreement gives both parties the 
right to sue. “[T]he retainer agreement determines whether the 
attorney represents the company and for what purposes. The retainer 
may require the attorney to represent the company and the insured, 
the company alone, or only the insured. Or, it may create a hybrid of 
these alternatives.”146 Because the duties of the insurance defense 
attorney are capable of being consensually altered by agreement, “the 
retainer agreement is of overwhelming importance in deciding what 
defense counsel’s responsibilities are to be.”147 Finally, although the 
retainer agreement is useful to the insurer and insured, it also provides 
insurance defense attorneys with a direct source from which to 
determine the scope of their duties to the insurer.148 Once the insurer 
and the insurance defense attorney create a retainer agreement, 
“judges should respect their decision.”149 Clearly, all parties involved 
in the tripartite relationship, including judges who are forced to 
interpret the scope of the unique relationships within this insurance 
triangle, would benefit by the retainer rule. 
A common criticism of the retainer rule is that “the tripartite 
relationship is really no different from any other multi-client 
representation in which the clients agree to allocate among 
themselves the responsibilities of managing the litigation and 
decision making.”150 Even though these critics acknowledge that an 
 
 144. See id. at 274. 
 145. See id. at 275. 
 146. Silver, supra note 82, at 1604. 
 147. Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 270–71. 
 148. See id. at 272–73. 
 149. Id. at 279. 
 150. Katherine E. Giddings & J. Stephen Zielezienski, Insurance Defense in the Twenty-
First Century: The Florida Bar’s Proposed Statement of Insured Client’s Rights—A Unique 
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attorney in such a multi-client relationship must “be cognizant of the 
potential for ethical risks,”151 they fail to appreciate the extent of the 
ethical risks uniquely inherent in the tripartite relationship.152 As 
discussed previously in this Note,153 it cannot be assumed that the 
insurer will always allow the insurance defense attorney to act in the 
insured’s best interest. 
Professor Stephen Pepper alleges that another weakness of the 
retainer agreement theory is that, because “there are obvious 
potential conflicts of interest between the [insurer and the insured] 
at the inception of the relationship,” it may be difficult, if not 
impossible to obtain the informed consent from both parties, 
especially the insured.154 However, juxtaposing the three alternative 
relationships between the insurer and the attorney (the one-client, 
two-client, or third-party-payor models) and the potential responses 
the insured may have to each of these relationships shows that 
informed consent should not be difficult to obtain from the insured. 
The three different relationships can be analogized to different 
products offered on the insurance market to customers desiring 
various levels of protection.155 When the retainer agreement expressly 
adopts the one-client model, the insured is provided with the highest 
level of liability protection. The insured knows and has complete 
confidence that the attorney’s duty is solely to protect its (the 
insured’s) interests. In the event that the retainer agreement expressly 
adopts the two-client model, the insured is aware that, although the 
attorney is representing its interest in the litigation, it also has a duty 
to the insurer who is financially responsible for providing the liability 
coverage for the insured. If the retainer agreement expressly adopts 
the third-party-payor model, the insured knows that, although the 
attorney’s sole duty is to represent its interests, the attorney may also 
be liable to the insurer if the insurer detrimentally relies on the 
attorney’s representations and is economically damaged as a result. An 
informed insured will understand that even in the third-party-payor 
 
Approach to the Tripartite Relationship, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 855, 856 (2001). 
 151. Id. at 858, 861. 
 152. Giddings and Zielezienski incorrectly suggest that “settled law” has already resolved 
the legal dilemmas regarding the tripartite relationship in the insurance defense context. See id. 
at 856–60. 
 153. See supra Part III.B. 
 154. Pepper, supra note 97, at 29. 
 155. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 1, at 262–63. 
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model, the attorney will feel pressure to adhere to the directions of the 
insurer, but perhaps not to the same degree as it would under the 
two-client model. 
Currently, the procedural standards established by the courts, 
including the Langerman court, seek to impose upon customers of 
liability insurance one of these three models as the governing regime 
in all circumstances. Under the retainer agreement standard, 
however, insurance liability customers are free to “shop the market” 
for their desired level of liability protection. Indeed, as is the case “in 
all other contexts,” including the health insurance context, insurance 
customers can chose between a plethora of levels of liability 
protection.156 The greater the protection, the more the product will 
cost to the consumer. Nevertheless, consumers (insureds) have the 
final choice regarding the level of liability protection they purchase; 
insureds will most likely give their informed consent to the insurance 
policy (with the corresponding duties) they purchase. Under the 
retainer agreement standard, all parties in the tripartite relationship 
will clearly know and understand their respective rights and duties. 
Ultimately, informed consent should not be a formidable barrier to 
implementation of the retainer rule. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to predict whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s 
decision in Langerman would have been altered had the court 
examined the retainer agreement between Paradigm and the 
Langerman Law Offices. Because of the procedural posture of 
Langerman,157 the Arizona Supreme Court viewed the facts in the 
light most favorable to Paradigm and assumed that malpractice by 
Langerman actually occurred and that such malpractice had injured 
Paradigm.158 Thus, by failing to even mention the existence of a 
retainer agreement between Langerman and Paradigm, the facts are 
insufficient to determine whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s 
decision would have been any different from its outcome had the 
retainer agreement been relied upon. However, although the retainer 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. The trial court judge that heard Langerman granted summary judgment in favor of 
Langerman. 24 P.3d 593, 600 (Ariz. 2001). Therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court, hearing 
the case on appeal, took the facts in the light most favorable to Paradigm. See id. at 594. 
 158. Id. 
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rule may not have changed the eventual outcome, the court’s use of 
the retainer rule in its analysis would have established concrete 
procedural standards for future cases. Essentially, the three main 
issues examined by the Langerman court—(1) whether an express 
agreement is necessary to form an attorney-client relationship, (2) 
whether there are potential conflicts of interest if the insurer is a 
second client, and (3) whether the lawyer has a duty to a non-
client—would have been non-issues because the retainer agreement 
would most likely have resolved each issue. 
Laws of professional responsibility govern conduct between lawyer 
and client,159 which, depending on the scope of the retainer 
agreement, can be the insured, the insurer, or both. The retainer rule 
requires that contract law, in addition to the rules of professional 
responsibility, influence the resolution of conflicts that frequently arise 
in the tripartite relationship. Neither the laws of professional 
responsibility nor the laws of contracts should operate 
independently;160 rather, in this unique tripartite realm of insurance 
defense litigation, both are needed to offer all parties, including the oft 
unaided defense attorney, proper procedural guidance. Such guidance, 
for the lawyer, is critical to avoiding malpractice liability and 
maintaining high ethical standards of representation. With the issue in 
Langerman being one of first impression in Arizona, the court failed 
to clarify the procedural standards governing whether an attorney is 
liable to an insurer for negligence. The Langerman court, on a fact-
specific basis, determined that the attorney was liable, but it failed to 
give adequate direction for insurance defense lawyers who seek to 
avoid such pitfalls in the future. 
Without procedural clarification, insurance defense lawyers will 
continue to traverse the obscurity of the tripartite relationship—
directionless. Utilizing the retainer agreement to define the duties of 
insurance defense counsel will minimize unwarranted risk in the 
unnecessarily risky business of lawyering in the tripartite relationship. 
Nathan Andersen 
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